We prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we prove existence and uniqueness of a "minimal" stationary equilibrium and of a "maximal" stationary equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave (non-quadratic) utilities. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D72.
Introduction
Collective decisionmaking, whether in firms, unions, or households in economics, or whether in committees and legislatures in political science, often takes the form of bargaining. Building on Rubinstein's [10] model of twoplayer, alternating-offer bargaining, Baron and Ferejohn [4] allow for an arbitrary number of individuals who must decide how to allocate a "dollar" among themselves using majority rule. In their model, in any period, one individual is randomly drawn to make a proposal, which is followed by a vote. If the proposal receives a majority of votes, then the dollar is divided as proposed, and bargaining ends. Otherwise, the individuals consume zero for the current period, and the bargaining process continues in the following period. Jackson and Moselle [7] consider the problem of dividing a dollar and simultaneously choosing a point in a one-dimensional policy space. Banks and Duggan [1] allow for an arbitrary compact, convex set of alternatives, for arbitrary continuous, concave utility functions, and for arbitrary "simple" voting rules, capturing as a special case the traditional one-dimensional spatial model, common in applications. Thus, rather than allocations of a transferable resource, alternatives may represent public policies, such as public good levels, tax rates, or interest rates, or they may index the ideological content of legislation in the liberal-conservative spectrum. Banks and Duggan [2] reconsider this model when the status quo is an arbitrary element of the policy space, rather than assuming a status quo payoff of zero, as in earlier models.
Analyses of bargaining typically focus on stationary subgame perfect equilibria, because of their simplicity (which may create a focal effect) and tractability. Of theoretical and practical interest, then, is whether stationary subgame perfect equilibria are unique in these models. In Rubinstein's model with two individuals, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and it is stationary, a strong result. Merlo and Wilson [8] have shown that, when an arbitrary number of agents bargain under unanimity rule, there is a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, even when the amount of the resource may vary stochastically over time. While Baron and Ferejohn [4] prove uniqueness within the class of symmetric equilibria, Eraslan [5] drops this restriction and establishes uniqueness in their model without the restriction of symmetry. However, Eraslan and Merlo [6] show that, if the amount to be divided varies stochastically in the Baron-Ferejohn model, where majority rule is used, then multiple stationary subgame perfect equilibria may obtain. Banks and Duggan [1, 2] show that, in the one-dimensional spatial model with majority rule and an odd number of perfectly patient in-dividuals, there is a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. In it, every individual proposes the median of the individuals' ideal points. And as individuals become arbitrarily patient, equilibrium outcomes converge to the median. They show that, in the two-dimensional spatial model, there can exist multiple equilibria.
In this paper, we consider the issue of uniqueness in the one-dimensional spatial model, allowing for an arbitrary common discount factor. Our analysis allows for both models of the status quo used in the literature, either assuming the status quo is an arbitrary element of the set of alternatives, or essentially giving all individuals a zero status quo payoff. For our first result, we allow for any simple voting rule that is "proper" (no two disjoint decisive coalitions) and "strong" (if a coalition is not decisive, then its complement is), capturing majority rule with an odd number of individuals. We prove that there is a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium under the standard, but restrictive, assumption of quadratic utilities. The proof uses the observation, apparently not noted before, that, assuming quadratic utilities, individual preferences over lotteries on the real line are order restricted, i.e., individuals can be ordered so that the coalition preferring any one lottery to any other is "connected," in a sense.
For our second result, we drop the assumptions that the voting rule is proper and strong, and allow for any continuous, concave, strictly quasiconcave utility functions. We prove that any two stationary subgame perfect equilibria must be nested, in the sense that the set of proposals that can be passed (the "social acceptance set") in one equilibrium will form a subset of the social acceptance set of the other equilibrium. This allows us to prove existence and uniqueness of a "minimal" and of a "maximal" stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple (nested) stationary subgame perfect equilibria when individuals, odd in number, have concave (non-quadratic) utility functions and majority rule is used.
Thus, uniqueness holds in an important specification of the model, demonstrating its tractability and its potential usefulness in applications in economics and political science. A partial uniqueness result holds more generally, but we have not investigated bounds on the extent of multiplicity, i.e., the gap between the minimal and maximal stationary equilibria. We leave that as an open question.
The Model
Let X ⊆ denote a nonempty, compact, convex set of alternatives, i.e., X is a closed, bounded interval. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a set of individuals with n ≥ 2, who play an infinite-horizon bargaining game over the set of alternatives. The bargaining in every period is described as follows. If no alternative has been accepted prior to period t, then (1) individual i ∈ N is recognized with probability ρ i , where ρ = (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ) ∈ ∆, the unit simplex in n . These recognition probabilities are exogenously fixed throughout the game. Each individual i's preferences over sequences of outcomes, and lotteries over them, are described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation u i : X → and a common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1) as follows. If x ∈ X is accepted in period t, then i's payoff is
which represents i's discounted utility from the status quo for the first t − 1 periods and from x every subsequent period. If no alternative is ever accepted, then each individual simply receives u i . We assume throughout that each u i is continuous, concave, and strictly quasi-concave. Letx i denote the uniquely defined utility-maximizing alternative, or "ideal point," for individual i. 1 Throughout the paper, we assume that D is nonempty and monotonic: C ∈ D and C ⊆ C imply C ∈ D. For some of our results, we impose additional restrictions on the voting rule. Say that
The core, denoted K, consists of the alternatives x ∈ X that are weakly preferred to all others according to the voting rule: for all y ∈ X and all C ∈ D, there exists i ∈ C such that u i (x) ≥ u i (y). If D is proper, then, because X is one-dimensional and individual preferences are "single-peaked," K is nonempty. If D is also strong, then K is actually a singleton and consists of the ideal pointx k of some individual k, the "core voter." 2 So far we have let the payoff from status quo be arbitrary. Now we define two alternative assumptions on status quo payoffs.
(A1) There exists q ∈ X such that, for every i ∈ N , u i = u i (q).
(A2) There exists u ∈ such that, for every i ∈ N and x ∈ X,
A1 assumes that the status quo is a point in the policy space, as in Banks and Duggan [2] . A2 follows Rubinstein [10] , Baron and Ferejohn [4] , and others in assuming a "bad" status quo and imposing the additional normalization that the status quo payoff is the same for all individuals.
Since our focus is only on equilibria in stationary strategies, we provide a formal definition only of such strategies. A (pure) stationary strategy for i ∈ N consists of a proposal p i ∈ X to be offered anytime i is recognized, and a measurable voting rule r i : X → {accept, reject}. For the latter, we will use the more convenient representation of an acceptance set, A i = r −1 i (accept), i.e., the set of proposals that i would vote to accept. Thus, a stationary strategy for i is a pair σ i = (p i , A i ), and we let σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) denote a profile of stationary strategies. Given a profile σ and given C ⊆ N , define the set
of proposals acceptable to all members of C, and define the social acceptance set
consisting of proposals that could be passed in any and all periods. The profile is a no-delay profile if
Informally, a profile σ constitutes a stationary equilibrium if, for all i ∈ N , p i is optimal given the acceptance sets of the other individuals, 2 To see this, first suppose x ∈ K but x is not an ideal point of any individual. Since D is strong, either {i|xi < x} ∈ D or {i|xi > x} ∈ D. In the first case, let j be the individual with maximum ideal point among the members of {i|x i < x}. By single-peakedness, all individuals in {i|xi < x} strictly preferxj to x, contradicting x ∈ K. A symmetric argument yields a contradiction in the second case. Now suppose that the core is not a singleton: x, x ∈ K and x < x . Since D is strong, either
and A i is optimal given that σ describes what would happen if a current proposal is rejected. Any strategy profile σ defines in an obvious manner a probability distribution over sequences of outcomes and, with it, an expected utility v i (σ) for each i ∈ N as evaluated at the beginning of the game. By stationarity, this is also i's continuation value throughout the game, i.e., i's expected utility evaluated at the beginning of the next period if the current period's proposal is rejected. If σ is a no-delay profile, then i's continuation value has the simple form
Formally, σ is a stationary equilibrium if two conditions hold. First, we require that the individuals' acceptance sets satisfy weak dominance, i.e., individual i votes for proposal x if and only if the utility from x is at least as great as that of rejecting the proposal and continuing to the next period: for all i ∈ N , we require that
This condition ensures that the individuals' votes are best responses, and that they are weakly undominated in the voting stage. Second, we require that the individuals' proposals satisfy sequential rationality, i.e., individual i, when recognized as proposer, either chooses utility-maximizing outcomes from within A or chooses an outcome that will be rejected, depending on which yields the higher payoff: for all i ∈ N , we require that
; that p i ∈ X\A when the inequality is reversed; and that either of these two conditions is satisfied when equality holds. In a no-delay stationary equilibrium, we have p i ∈ A, and consequently
The next lemma establishes useful properties of equilibrium social acceptance sets.
Lemma 1. Assume either A1 or A2. If σ is a no-delay stationary equilibrium, then A is a nonempty, compact interval.
Proof. Compactness of A follows from compactness of X and continuity of each u i . To prove non-emptiness, define the expected alternative following rejection of a proposal as x = i∈N ρ i p i . By concavity, we have
Thus, x ∈ A i for all i ∈ N , and this implies x ∈ A. Under A1, we define x * = (1 − δ)q + δx. Now concavity implies
Thus, x * ∈ A i for all i ∈ N , and this implies x * ∈ A. To prove convexity, let z = min A and z = max A, and let C, C ∈ D satisfy z ∈ A C and z ∈ A C . Take any x ∈ [z, z]. Without loss of generality, we can assume
Allowing mixed proposal strategies, Banks and Duggan [1, 2] establish the existence of no-delay stationary equilibria under A1 and A2, assuming X is a compact, convex subset of finite-dimensional Euclidean space. Those papers also prove that all no-delay stationary equilibria are in pure strategies when X is one-dimensional, so it is without loss of generality that we restrict attention to pure strategies. Furthermore, Banks and Duggan [1] prove that, under weak conditions including δ < 1, all stationary equilibria are nodelay, whereas Banks and Duggan [2] prove this holds unless q ∈ K. Thus, the results below, which are stated in terms of no-delay equilibria, can be strengthened somewhat: under A2, we can drop "no-delay," while under A1 we can drop it unless q ∈ K.
Results
Banks and Duggan [1] prove that "core equivalence" holds when X ⊆ , δ = 1, ρ i > 0 for all i ∈ N , and D is proper: the social acceptance sets corresponding to no-delay stationary equilibria are singletons, always consisting of some core point. If D is strong, so the core itself is a singleton, then there is a unique no-delay stationary equilibrium. The question of uniqueness when δ < 1, which we take up here, is not addressed. We first examine the issue of uniqueness for the important special case of quadratic utility, meaning that u i (x) = −(x −x i ) 2 for all x ∈ X. With this assumption, our first proposition establishes uniqueness for the case in which D is strong. The proof, in the appendix, uses the result that the core voter is decisive under these conditions, i.e., a proposal is passed in equilibrium if and only if it is preferred to rejection by the core voter.
Proposition 1. Assume either A1 or A2. Assume D is proper and strong. If u i is quadratic for all i ∈ N , then there is a unique no-delay stationary equilibrium.
Proof. Let σ and σ be no-delay stationary equilibria, and suppose σ = σ . Since D is proper and strong, K = {x k } for some k ∈ N . Let u = (1 − δ)u k + δv k (σ), and u = (1 − δ)u k + δv k (σ ). By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in the Appendix, we have A = {x ∈ X | u k (x) ≥ u} and A = {x ∈ X | u k (x) ≥ u }. If u = u , then A = A . But then, by no-delay and sequential rationality, for all i ∈ N , p i = p i , which contradicts σ = σ . Thus, u = u . Without loss of generality, assume u > u , implying A ⊆ A . Then we have
(1)
We claim that, for all i ∈ C, u k (p i ) = u. Suppose not. Then there exists an i ∈ C such that p i ∈ int(A), which implies p i =x i by sequential rationality. Then since A ⊆ A , sequential rationality implies p i = p i , contradicting i ∈ C. We can write
and
Note that i∈N (2), we then have
which contradicts (1).
We next consider the extent to which uniqueness carries over to the general case of continuous, concave, and strictly quasi-concave preferences. The following proposition establishes that every pair of no-delay stationary equilibria are nested. 
If not, then we can find > 0 satisfying x + ∈ A j for every j ∈ C y . But then x + ∈ A, which contradicts A = [x, x]. Now we will show that the existence of such an i implies y − x < y − x. Since i ∈ C y ,
From (4) and (5), we have
Note that the righthand side of the latter inequality is equal to
, which is less than or equal to max{u
We claim thatx i < y. If x < y, then the claim is true becausex i ≤ x, so suppose x ≥ y andx i ≥ y. Then, however, max{u (6) and proving the claim. Thus, we have two cases. Case 1:
. Since x < y and x < y, concavity of u i implies, y − x < y − x. Case 2: x <x i < y.
Therefore, we've shown that
, and a symmetric argument shows y − x > y − x, a contradiction.
Proposition 2 shows that when the policy space is one-dimensional, all no-delay stationary equilibria are comparable with each other in terms of set inclusion of the corresponding social acceptance sets. A no-delay stationary equilibrium σ is minimal if A(σ) ⊆ A(σ ) for every no-delay stationary equilibrium σ , and it is maximal if A(σ ) ⊆ A(σ) for every no-delay stationary equilibrium σ . Under A1 and A2, Banks and Duggan [1, 2] prove upper hemicontinuity as well as existence of no-delay stationary equilibria. With these results, Proposition 2 yields the following corollary. Proof. Let Σ be the set of no-delay stationary equilibria, which is nonempty by existence theorems in Banks and Duggan [1, 2] . Let A * = σ∈Σ A(σ), where A(σ) denotes the social acceptance set corresponding to a given equilibrium σ. By Lemma 1 and Proposition 2, {A(σ) | σ ∈ Σ} is a collection of compact sets with the finite intersection property. From this, the compactness of X, and Lemma 1, it follows that A * is a nonempty, compact interval. Define x = min A * and x = max A * . Construct a sequence of lies in the compact set X n , there is a subsequence that has a limit point, say p * = (p * 1 , . . . , p * n ). Let σ * = (p * , A * ). By upper hemicontinuity of no-delay stationary equilibria, σ * is a no-delay stationary equilibrium, and by construction, it is minimal. Furthermore, by strict quasi-concavity, the proposals satisfying sequential rationality, given A * , are unique, implying uniqueness of minimal no-delay stationary equilibrium. Existence and uniqueness of maximal no-delay stationary equilibrium is proved similarly, letting A * = σ∈Σ A(σ) and defining x = inf A * and x = sup A * .
The preceding proposition leaves open the general question of uniqueness, achieved in Proposition 1 by the decisiveness of the core voter, which is guaranteed by quadratic preferences. The following example shows that multiple equilibria are possible when such a decisive voter does not exist.
Example 1. Multiple equilibria
Let X = [0, 13], n = 5, q = 0, and δ = 5/6. Let ρ i = 1/5 for every i. We consider majority voting rule, i.e., D is the collection of all subsets of N with at least three elements. Assume utility functions of individuals are as follows.
• u 1 (x) = −|x − 1|
Consider a strategy profile σ = ((p 1 , A 1 ) , . . . , (p 5 , A 5 )) in which proposals and acceptance sets are as follows.
• p 1 = 4, p 2 = 6, p 3 = 8, p 4 = 10, and p 5 = 12.
• Given the profile of acceptance sets, the social acceptance set is A = [4, 12] , so σ is a no-delay profile. Note that the social acceptance set is different from the acceptance set of individual 3, who is the core voter in this setting. Here, the continuation lottery corresponding to σ places probability 1/6 on each proposal, and it can be checked that every A i satisfies weak dominance; for example, A 3 described above satisfies weak dominance since the expected utility of rejection for individual 3 is
Also given that A = [4, 12] , each proposal is sequentially rational. Thus, σ is a no-delay stationary equilibrium. Now consider another strategy profile σ = ((p 1 , A 1 ) , . . . , (p 5 , A 5 )) in which proposals and acceptance sets are as follows.
• p 1 = 3, p 2 = 6, p 3 = 8, p 4 = 10, and p 5 = 13.
• [3, 13] , and
Given the profile of acceptance sets, the social acceptance set is A = [3, 13] , so σ also is a no-delay profile. It can be easily verified that σ is also a no-delay stationary equilibrium.
A Appendix
In the following two lemmas, we assume that D is proper and strong, and we show that, in any no-delay stationary equilibrium, the social acceptance set equals the acceptance set of the core voter k, assuming quadratic preferences and either A1 or A2. The first result is proved by establishing that the individuals' preferences over lotteries on X are order restricted, in the sense that they can be ordered, i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n (where i j is the jth individual in the ordering), so that, for every pair of lotteries λ and λ ,
where I < J indicates that i < j for all i ∈ I and all j ∈ J (cf. Rothstein, [9] ). As a consequence, the core voter k is "decisive," i.e., k prefers a lottery λ to a lottery λ if and only if all members of some decisive coalition prefer λ to λ . The lemma extends Lemma 1 of Banks and Duggan [3] to all proper, strong voting rules, whereas their Lemma 1 considers only majority rule (but allows for a continuum of voters). The key property of quadratic utilities used is mean-variance analysis: we can write i's expected utility from a lottery λ as u i (m) − s, where m is the mean of λ and s is the variance.
In both lemmas, let Proof. We claim that individual preferences over lotteries on X are order restricted when individuals are ordered in the order of their ideal points. For any distinct pair of lotteries λ and λ , let
Thus, we claim that if h ∈ C 1 , i ∈ C 2 , and j ∈ C 3 , then eitherx h >x i >x j orx h <x i <x j . Let m and s denote the mean and variance of λ, and let m and s denote the mean and variance of λ . If m = m , then every individual prefers the lottery with smaller variance, so the claim is vacuously
Similarly,
Thus, we have
If m > m , then this impliesx h >x i >x j ; if m < m , then it implies x h <x i <x j . This establishes the claim. Consider any no-delay stationary equilibrium σ. Take any x ∈ A k , i.e., u k (x) ≥ (1 − δ)u k (q) + δv k (σ). This means that individual k weakly prefers the point mass on x to the lottery corresponding σ, namely, the lottery that puts probability 1−δ on q and, for each i ∈ N , probability δρ i on p i . By order-restriction, either x ∈ A C L ∪{k} or x ∈ A C R ∪{k} . This establishes A k ⊆ A. Now take any x ∈ A, and suppose x / ∈ A k . Since k strictly prefers the lottery corresponding to σ to the point mass on x, order-restriction implies either {i | Thus, f (z) < 0 for all z > x, which establishes the claim. Now note that x ∈ A if and only if {i | x ∈ A i } ∈ D, which, by the above argument, holds if and only if C * = {i |x i ≤ x} ∈ D. If x ∈ A k , thenx k ≤ x, which implies that C L ∪ {k} is a subset of C * , so C * is decisive, so x ∈ A. If x / ∈ A k , theñ x k > x, which implies that C * is a subset of C L , so it is not decisive, so x / ∈ A. A symmetric argument can be made for the x > m case.
